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ABSTRACT 
 Social media has become a significant aspect of American life and culture. 
Criminal groups including extremists of various ideological milieus have found social 
media useful in their recruitment efforts. Further, these online spaces allow extremists to 
easily interact with one another, reinforcing each other’s radical perspectives. Little 
research has examined social media’s role in radicalization and fewer studies have tested 
the differences between the radicalization processes of individuals espousing disparate 
ideologies. Using Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States, a data set of 
804 extremist men, this study sets out to determine whether the role of social media in the 
radicalization process varies between Islamist and far right extremists using social 
learning as a theoretical framework. The results indicate no significant difference 
regarding the role of social media in radicalization between Islamists and far rightists. 
Additionally, the odds of having radical friends and family were much lower for Islamists 
than far rightists, suggesting only partial support for social learning theory as an 
explanation of radicalization.  
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Introduction 
 In the last decade, social media has become an omnipresent feature of American 
life with 94% of American young adults being active users of YouTube, 80% having a 
Facebook account, 45% on Twitter, and 70% on Instagram and Snapchat (Smith and 
Anderson, 2018; Wolcott, 2008). Social media has forged a pathway to a young global 
audience and has proven to be a useful tool for a variety of social and anti-social groups 
interested in generating support for their cause, including terrorist organizations. 
Extremists from various ideological milieus have established a strong presence in 
cyberspace. This does not come as a surprise given the capability of the internet to 
connect like-minded individuals to each other on a global scale.  
Islamist terrorist organizations such as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) have 
adopted the use of social media for radicalizing and recruiting new members in the West, 
which has proven to be an effective strategy (Gates and Podder, 2015; Halverson and 
Way, 2012; Kirby, 2007; Picart, 2015; Thompson, 2011). While there has been a recent 
surge in research examining the relationship between radicalization and social media, 
most of it focuses solely on Islamic terrorism. This is problematic given that between 
1954 and 2000, right wing terrorism accounted for 31.2% of terrorist related incidents 
and 51.6% of terrorism related deaths (Taylor, Currie, and Holbrook, 2013). While 
knowledge concerning the radicalization process of individuals belonging to a single 
ideology is critical to our in-depth understanding of terrorism, it is imperative that 
different types of extremists are compared to determine where, if any, overlaps exist.  
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 This thesis addresses the need for research comparing disparate extremist groups 
by using a data set of hundreds of extremists who radicalized in the United States to 
determine if the presence of social media in the process of radicalization varies between 
Islamist and far right extremists. A primary feature of social media is the ability to 
interact with anyone, anywhere; thus, this study takes the opportunity to further test the 
influence of interaction with radical others online or offline by applying social learning 
theory. By doing so, perhaps we can better understand the mechanisms of radicalization.  
This paper adopts definitions of key terms from the data used for the current 
analysis. Radicalization is the “psychological, emotional, and behavioral processes by 
which an individual adopts an ideology that promotes the use of violence for the 
attainment of political, economic, religious, or social goals” (“PIRUS,” n.d., para. 6). 
Jihadism is defined as:  
A militant methodology practiced by Sunni Islamist-Salafists who seek the 
immediate overthrow of incumbent regimes and the non-Muslim geopolitical 
forces which support them in order to pave the way for an Islamist society which 
would be developed through martial power. (START, 2018, p. 4)  
Lastly, the far-right is designated: 
The ideology of the far-right is generally exclusivist and favors social hierarchy, 
seeking an idealized future favoring a particular group, whether this group 
identity is racial, pseudo-national or characterized by individualistic traits. The 
extremist far-right commonly show antipathy to the political left and the federal 
government. As a result of this heterodoxy, this category includes radical 
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individuals linked to extremist religious groups, non-religious racial supremacists, 
tax protestors, sovereign citizens, militias, and militant gun rights advocates. 
(START, 2018, p. 4) 
The first section of this paper reviews the literature on the radicalization process, 
extremist online content, and social learning theory and its application to radicalization. 
This is followed by a description of the data set, the application of multiple imputation 
using chained equations (MICE) to cope with missing data, and the variables included in 
the regression models. Finally, the results are reported, and implications and future 
research directions are discussed.  
Literature Review  
The Process of Radicalization  
 Currently, a few risk factors for radicalization have been consistently found across 
research. Many argue that the presence of a grievance—either directed at one’s personal 
life, society, or government—is common among radicals (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; 
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Precht, 2007). In their examination of Colleen 
LaRose—A white American woman who became a jihadist and was embroiled in an 
international assassination plot—Halverson and Way (2012) chronicle LaRose’s feelings 
of marginalization at the hands of Western society, and how those emotions lead her to 
connect with radical Islamists who shared her views of the West. Feelings of isolation are 
thematically frequent among cases of radicalization as well (Omotoyinbo, 2014; Picart, 
2015). In the same Halverson and Way (2012) study, the authors highlight the feelings of 
solitude experienced by LaRose, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold (the Columbine 
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shooters), and Terry Lynn Nichols (the Oklahoma City bomber) preceding their extremist 
acts. Aspiring to change or reshape one’s identity is also a common motif. Though, 
current research suggests not everyone is looking to alter their identity in the same way. 
LaRose saw becoming a jihadist as transforming her identity into that of a warrior; an 
identity that better resembles those of action heroes in fantasy films she was obsessed 
with (Picart, 2015). Alternatively, Precht (2007) argues in his review of academic and 
government literature that many radicalize as a part of an Islamist movement as a means 
to strengthen their Muslim identity. Lastly, a desire for significance often precipitates 
radical thought and action (Picart, 2015; Precht, 2007).  
While similar mechanisms of radicalization have been found between different 
cases, it is not clear how they fit together within the broader process. While various 
models have similar elements, they vary based on measurement level, included variables, 
and time order among others. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) propose that 
radicalization can occur at three levels: individual, group, and mass. At the individual 
level, they argue radicalization is the result of personal or identity group grievances. 
Radicalization at the group level is the product of small group face-to-face interactions. 
Political groups and public masses can become radicalized through conflict with other 
bureaucratic groups and states. They contend that radicalization at the individual level is 
rare; even “lone wolves” such as Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber) were associated with a 
larger ideological movement. This observation is common among studies on terrorism; 
radicalization in ideological isolation seems the exception rather than the rule. McCauley 
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and Moskalenko (2008) believe feelings of camaraderie serve to pull individuals into 
radical movements and keep them there.  
Regarding specifically Islamists, Precht (2007) further asserts the notion that 
radicalization more often occurs in group settings. He identified four overlapping phases 
of radicalizing into an Islamist movement that group members move through together: 
Pre-radicalization, conversion and identification, conviction and indoctrination, and 
action. Pre-radicalization involves the many background factors that may make an 
individual more susceptible to radicalization. Precht (2007) found these factors to be a 
“Muslim identity crisis, experience of discrimination, alienation and perceived injustices, 
personal traumas, neighborhood, living conditions, family, and relative absence of 
Muslim public debate on Islamic terrorism in the community” (p. 34). In the conversion 
and identification phase, an individual’s religious identity and behavior shifts. This can 
mean one who previously did not practice a religion now does, a shift from a socially 
acceptable form of practicing religion to a more radical variation, or a move from one 
religion to another. In phase three—conviction and indoctrination—the individual 
isolates themselves from most non-radical others and further roots themselves in 
extremist Islam ideology and its cause. It is in this phase that associations with radical 
others plays a significant role, serving to reinforce each other’s radicalization. In the final 
phase of action, “each member accepts the obligation of carrying out a terrorist attack” 
(p. 37); attack plotting and preparation occurs in this phase (Precht, 2007). Similar to 
other proposed models, the process described by Precht (2007) is not entirely linear 
(Sageman, 2008). Individuals can stop their progression through the process within any 
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phase, or re-enter previous phases. Also, the time it takes to reach the critical fourth phase 
varies, with some moving through the whole process in a few months, and others taking 
years.  
Many assert a fully linear process of radicalization does not exist; rather, 
individual pathways are unique (Picart, 2015; Precht, 2007). Hafez and Mullins (2015) 
suggest the best way to think about radicalization is not as a linear process, but as a 
jigsaw puzzle: focusing on the “pieces” with the understanding how they fit together is 
contextual. In their review of the literature on Islamist radicalization, they found the 
pieces of the puzzle to be grievances, radical networks, ideology, and enabling 
environments and support structures. Much research has worked within a similar 
framework: not focusing on the creation of a universal and linear radicalization process, 
but on the mechanisms within the process, with the understanding that the weight and 
placement of each mechanism varies from case to case. While terrorism researchers have 
identified grievances, isolation, identity, and desire for significance as consistent 
predictors of radicalization, there are most likely many more variables to be tested and 
added to this minute list. Nevertheless, researchers generally agree the process of 
radicalization is mostly non-linear and varies from person to person.   
Extremism Online 
The Internet has made radicalization possible on a scale never seen before. The 
voices of radicals that were once only heard in the most isolated corners of the world can 
now be broadcast to a global audience in multiple languages (Decker & Pyrooz, 2011; 
Liepman, 2009; Thompson, 2011). Al-Qaeda’s website for example is designed to host 
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individuals from over two-hundred countries (Omotoyinbo, 2014). Westerners who were 
once barricaded from extremists and their recruiting attempts now find themselves within 
their grasp. Utilizing the internet to radicalize seems to have become the principal method 
of recruitment given the difficulty of physically connecting with far-away individuals in 
an era of heightened global security (Kirby, 2007). While there is not nearly enough 
evidence to suggest online radicalization has effectively replaced face-to-face 
radicalization, research indicates the Internet provides individuals innumerable 
opportunities to be exposed to extremist content, and persons struggling to find their 
place in the real-world stumbling across radical messages emphasizing purpose and 
belonging can prove to have deadly consequences (Picart, 2015; Precht, 2007).  
Extremist websites. 
On the internet, radical groups have largely relied upon their official websites and 
non-member generated sites to radicalize and recruit new members and to rally the 
current membership (Conway, 2019; Omotoyinbo, 2014). Websites associated with the 
far-right often contain racist symbols such as swastikas and burning crosses, as well as 
entire texts or passages from foundational pieces of racist literature like The Turner 
Diaries and Mein Kampf (Gerstenfeld, Grant, and Chiang, 2003). An analysis of the 
mission statements from six white supremacist websites revealed efforts to bolster a 
collective white identity through rhetoric arguing for the supremacy of Whites and the 
existence of conspiratorial “others” attempting to undermine the White race, as Adams 
and Roscigno (2005) succinctly explain: 
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Broadly, white supremacist organizations are concerned with the perceived white 
political deprivation and the possibility of becoming a numerical minority. These 
concerns are routinely articulated through rhetoric representing whites as victims 
of systematic governmental, legal, and societal abuses. These problems are often 
attributed to ‘liberalism’ or ‘multiculturism,’ essentially code words for any 
manner of thought which does not inherently privilege a white status quo. (p. 772) 
A considerable amount of online extremist content is aimed at younger audiences, 
including children (Bott et al., 2009; Gates & Podder, 2015). Inspire, an online magazine 
published by Al-Qaeda, is tailored to appeal to young, English-speaking men in an effort 
to create home-grown terrorists (Thompson, 2011). Picart (2015) argues Islamist radicals 
attempt to make their online content look “cool” through youthful language and rap lingo. 
Also, themes of heroism are regularly used by Islamist groups to motivate purpose-
seeking youths to join the movement and mobilize. This often involves portraying 
organization members as soldiers fighting valiantly against their enemies, an attractive 
image to adventurous youths (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Liepman, 2009). While much of 
the contemporary research has focused on Islamist group’s utilization of this tactic, far-
right groups are not alien to its use (Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2012).  
Beyond publishing hateful media content and radical discourse, both far-right and 
Islamist sites have been known to promote and provide manuals for violence (Gerstenfeld 
et al., 2003; Levin, 2015). Instructions for foreign travel and the manufacturing of suicide 
vests are frequently found on Jihadi sites (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). In his analysis of the 
London Bombers (also known as the 7/7 Bombers)—home-grown Islamist extremists 
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who detonated multiple bombs in London, killing 52 and injuring over 700—Kirby 
(2007) argues it is likely the bombers used the internet to gain knowledge on the making 
of explosives. He goes on to describe how the perpetrators of the London attacks 
represent a new form of terrorism, “Through online operational instruction, groups like 
the London Bombers can be actively inspired by Al-Qaeda, execute attacks to emulate 
and mimic Al-Qaeda, without ever having formally joined the network” (p. 425). While 
some radical far-right sites have encouraged the use of violence, they rarely provide how-
to guides like their Jihadist counterparts (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003).  
A good deal of research has explored the plethora of extremist content on websites, 
but its role in radicalization has yet to be conclusively determined. Some believe its 
primary function is to reinforce already existent extremist views (Archetti, 2015; 
Conway, 2017; Von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). In the case of the 7/7 
Bombers mentioned previously, Kirby (2007) suggests extremist online content may have 
played a part in the disintegration of the bomber’s compliance with British norms. 
Further, there has been debate on the magnitude of the Internet’s influence. Some 
researchers contend that passively absorbing radical content online is not enough to 
radicalize on its own (Liepman, 2009). The most common perception is interaction with 
other extremists is a critical component of the radicalization process, but the internet has 
utility in this regard as well.  
Extremist social media. 
In the last few years there has been a marked decrease in online Islamist and far-right 
activity outside of social media. Many web-based magazines, which were once a 
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significant part of the Islamist propaganda machine, have largely disappeared. Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula’s popular Inspire magazine went dark in 2016 and Gaida 
Matani, a magazine published by al-Shabaab, disappeared in 2017 (Conway, 2019). 
Rather, extremist groups seem to be increasingly relying on social media sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, and YouTube to spread propaganda, radicalize, and recruit 
new members (Choi, Lee, and Cadigan, 2018). Social media comes with numerous 
advantages in terms of spreading radicalizing content and propaganda, including the 
ability connect with other people, the capacity to share one post across different sites, and 
users’ ability to spread posts further (Hafez & Mullins, 2015); this makes it exceptionally 
difficult for authorities to remove such material.  
Original content creation is not limited to bona fide members either; for example, 
while media items put out by ISIS on the internet decreased between 2017 and 2018, 
user-generated content from supporters increased (Conway, 2019). ISIS leaders have 
taken notice and circulated videos supporting and instructing followers on the creation 
and dissemination of radical content. They also have expanded recruitment efforts: 
targeting adept social media users as well as soldiers (Gates & Podder, 2015). As to the 
suggested role of social media in radicalization, Sageman (2008) suggests, “…online 
forums… promote the image of terrorist heroes, promote extremist ideas, link users to the 
virtual social movement, give them guidance, and instruct them in tactics” (p. 227). This 
fragment of the internet allows for the completion of a myriad of tasks beyond 
recruitment with practically no resources (Marcu & Balteanu, 2014); for example, 
Hezbollah uses Facebook to monitor the activities of Israeli soldiers. Social media also 
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allows propaganda designed to generate fear, such as videos of threats and beheadings, to 
be spread to a wide audience (Akins & Winfree, 2016; Choi, Lee, and Cadigan, 2018).  
It is a similar story for the far-right. While websites such as the Daily Stormer 
maintain healthy traffic, most far-right hate content comes in the form of text posts and 
memes on social media sites like Reddit and 4Chan. Gab, a recently launched Reddit-like 
site strongly associated with the far-right, has 450,000 users who have generated 30 
million comments; pro-Trump sentiments, anti-immigration, conspiracy theories, and 
white nationalism are common themes found there (Conway, 2019).  
What separates websites where users spend their time passively consuming content 
and social media sites are the levels of social interaction and community (Coulson, 2013; 
Picart, 2015), as Akins and Winfree (2016) explain: 
Active participation in Facebook groups focusing on conspiracy theories, white 
supremacy, anti-government ideology, fundamentalist religions, jihadism, inter alia, 
provides the participant with access to ideology, instant ‘friends’ in the group, a 
social network, justifications and mandates for violence, and explanations for the 
participant’s unhappiness. (p. 142) 
In her thematic analysis of Stormfront, a far-right social media site, Bowman-Grieve 
(2009) describes it as a community of practice, which is defined as, “A social learning 
environment where members share their experiences and opinion, their ideologies and 
outlooks; over time such communities develop their own set of norms and have the 
potential to contribute to the creation of very real values” (p. 1,005). Principally, social 
media can provide a sense of belonging and relationships with like-minded others, which 
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in turn plays a role in shaping and reinforcing one’s beliefs in the direction of extremism; 
in some cases, radical thought leads to radical action. As mentioned previously, there is a 
current ongoing debate on the ability of online radicalization to efficiently replace in-
person radicalization, even with social media in the picture. Some contend the Internet is 
succeeding face-to-face interactions as the primary method of radicalization (Sageman, 
2008). Others believe there is peer pressure associated with being a member of a physical 
group that motivates individuals to participate in extremist activities that cannot be 
recreated in a virtual setting (Bostdorff, 2004). Presently, there is not enough evidence to 
swing the pendulum decisively in one direction versus the other.  
Learning Extremism 
With literature consistently naming extremist others, in online or offline settings, 
as a vital component of radicalization, it is beneficial to test social learning theory’s 
(SLT) aptitude for predicting it. Further, it is difficult to make predictions when a 
preponderance of the literature is case studies; SLT serves as a guide in this sense. With 
roots in Skinner’s (1959) work on behavior, social learning theory was conceived by 
Bandura (1969) and popularized within criminology by Akers (1973). SLT asserts “the 
same learning process in a context of social structure, interaction, and situation produces 
both conforming and deviant behavior” (Akers & Jensen, 2008, p. 38). There are four 
primary elements of SLT: differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement, 
and imitation. Differential association concerns interacting with others who behave a 
certain way or are supportive of such behavior. The more an individual’s associations 
lean towards deviancy, the more likely deviant behavior is to occur. Associations with 
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family and friends are often the most important to consider due to them developing 
earlier, occupying more of one’s time, happening more frequently, and involving those an 
individual has close relationships with (Akers & Jensen, 2008); but, interaction with other 
groups, such as those on the internet, can influence behavior as well (Warr, 2002). 
Through differential associates, individuals learn definitions favorable or unfavorable to 
deviance; definitions being defined as, “One’s own orientations, rationalizations, 
justifications, excuses, and other attitudes that define the commission of an act as 
relatively more right or wrong, good or bad, desirable or undesirable, justified or 
unjustified, and appropriate or inappropriate” (Akers and Jensen, 2008, p. 39); the more 
one accepts attitudes that approve of or justify deviant behavior, the more likely aforesaid 
behavior will occur. Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or 
anticipated rewards and punishments that result from behavior. The initial deviant act and 
the probability of it and analogous behaviors being repeated in the future partly depend 
on this balancing act, with deviancy being more likely when rewards outweigh 
punishments. Lastly, imitation is behavior that occurs after its direct or indirect 
observation; the individual performing the behavior, the behavior itself, and the observed 
consequences of the behavior are all factors that determine whether or not the behavior 
will be copied. Sequentially, SLT contends these concepts and the variables encompassed 
within will precede the initial deviant act more often than not and will continue to predict 
future behavior based on accumulated learning history. Though, the theory recognizes 
this will not always be the case. Sometimes people apply definitions ex post facto in an 
attempt to justify the behavior to themselves or others; in which case, differential 
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association, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation (to a lesser degree after 
onset) will predict whether or not the behavior will be repeated (Akers and Jensen, 2008).  
 Although terrorism has not been in the eye of criminology for long, several 
studies have tested, and validated social learning theory’s application to this phenomenon 
(Becker, 2017). The presence of radical peers is regularly found to be significant in 
terrorism research, and these interactions do not have to take place within formalized 
groups, as explained by Gilperez-Lopez, Torregrosa, Barhamgi, and Camacho (2017): 
“Having a relationship with a same-minded individual, not necessarily as a part of a 
group (and sharing material, information, or even opinions with that close radicalized 
friend) can become a critical factor to become radicalized” (p. 14). In one of the few 
quantitative analyses examining extremists, LaFree, Jensen, James, and Safer-
Lichtenstein (2018) found radical peers to be the strongest predictor of political violence 
among other social learning and social control measures. Other studies not specifically 
applying social learning theory have found radicalization to most often occur within 
networks of radicalized others (Precht, 2007). Of the utmost importance to the present 
study, these interactions are not limited to face-to-face encounters; they occur online as 
much as they do offline (Akins & Winfree Jr., 2016).  
 Upon reviewing the body of work on radicalization and social media’s role in it, 
two gaps became apparent. First, much of what is believed to be known about this 
process is based on studies looking at one or a handful of extremists, which makes it 
difficult to generalize the findings beyond those individuals. Second, the population of 
interest for most studies has been all extremists or extremists of a single ideological 
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movement; while informative, it is crucial that similar and disparate patterns of 
radicalization between extremists of different movements and even similar movements 
(for example, neo-Nazis and Ku-Klux-Klan members) are examined (Decker & Pyrooz, 
2011). This paper aims to address both of these voids by using a large data set of 
individuals radicalized within the United States to answer the question, does the presence 
of social media in the process of radicalization vary between Islamist and far-right 
extremists? With much of the research highlighting the strategic use of social media by 
Islamists to radicalize and recruit, and literature on far-right extremism painting a picture 
of a less organized and tactical approach to social media, the first hypothesis is as 
follows.  
H1: The odds of social media playing a role in radicalization will be higher for 
individuals radicalizing as a part of an Islamist movement than those radicalizing 
as a part of a far right movement.   
Akers and Jensen (2008) argue SLT “Is a general theory that offers an explanation of the 
acquisition, maintenance, and change in criminal and deviant behavior that embraces, 
social, nonsocial, and cultural factors operating both to motivate and control criminal 
behavior and both to promote and undermine conformity” (p.38). Inarguably, extremist 
acts—regardless of ideology—are forms of criminal and deviant behavior, thus SLT 
should explain Islamist and far right radicalization. hypothesis 2 states: 
H2: There will be no significant difference in the odds of having radical friends 
and family between those radicalized as a part of an Islamist movement and those 
radicalized as a part of a far right movement.   
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Methods 
Data 
 This study uses data from Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United 
States (PIRUS)1 to test its hypotheses (START, 2018). PIRUS contains information 
derived from public sources on 804 Islamist and far right extremist men whose 
radicalization took place within the United States between 2005 and 20172. To have been 
included in the data set, an individual had to meet a variety of criteria. First, one had to 
have been one of the following: arrested, indicted of a crime, killed as a result of his or 
her ideological activities, a member of a designated terrorist organization, or associated 
with an extremist organization whose leader(s) or founder(s) have been indicted of an 
ideologically motivated violent offense3. Second, an individual had to be radicalized in 
the United States, meaning the process began in-country and all or most of their 
radicalization also occurred in the U.S. Last, an individual had to have espoused 
ideological motives that were linked to the behavior(s) of interest. The data was collected 
                                                             
1 PIRUS is publicly available on the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) website. 
  
2 PIRUS originally contained 2,148 individuals who had radicalized as parts of Islamist, 
far right, far left, or single issue movements from 1948-2017. Social media variables 
were only coded for cases that occurred in or after 2005, so 1,109 pre-2005 cases were 
dropped. Females comprised only 8.18% of the resulting data set, meaning gender 
differences would have been driven by only a handful of cases; thus, females were 
dropped from the analysis. There were few far left (7.23%) and single issue (8.49%) 
cases in the next iteration of the data set; since the results would primarily be driven by 
differences between Islamists and far rightists, far left and single issue cases were 
dropped so the analysis could better serve as a direct comparison between Islamists and 
far rightists.  
 
3 Note that an individual’s radical activities did not have to be violent.  
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by investigators utilizing a multi-stage approach (“PIRUS,” n.d., para. 2). First, they 
gathered names and information on roughly 4,000 individuals using open-sources such as 
“court documents, online newspaper articles, newspaper archives, open-source 
nongovernment reports” and START assets such as the Global Terrorism Database 
(LaFree, Jensen, James, & Safer-Lichtenstein, 2018, p. 244). Second, all individuals were 
coded on select variables to determine their inclusion in the data set based on the 
previously mentioned criteria. Third, in an effort to increase representativeness, 
researchers took a random sample from those chosen for inclusion and fully coded them. 
PIRUS’s primary advantage is it is one of few systematically collected data sets on 
radical individuals publicly available. With alternatives lacking, PIRUS is the best dataset 
to test the present hypotheses. 
Missing Data Procedure 
 Problematically, not all information on the subjects is complete. While some 
variables have no missing information, others are missing at nearly 62% (See Table 1 for  
proportions of missing data for each variable). Why data is missing can rarely be 
precisely determined; one of three mechanisms is often assumed: missing completely at 
random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and missing not at random (MNAR) 
(Johnson & Young, 2011; “Multiple Imputation in Stata,” n.d.). MCAR presumes neither 
the missing value itself or the other variables in the data set predict missingness, a very 
strong assumption. Given the information in PIRUS was pulled almost entirely from open 
sources, an assumption of MCAR is indefensible (Becker, 2017). A more realistic 
presumption and the one utilized in the present analysis is MAR, which states other 
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variables in the model but not the variable itself can predict missingness on the latter. 
Proceeding under the assumption of MAR, multiple imputation using chained equations 
(MICE) was used to fill in missing observations. Put simply, MICE runs a series of 
regressions where each variable with missing information is modeled conditional on the 
other variables in the imputation model4 to predict missing data points; this process is 
repeated m number of times, generating multiple data sets (Azur, Stuart, Frangakis, & 
Leaf, 2011). The generation of multiple predictions for each unobserved value accounts 
for the uncertainty in the imputed values and results in accurate standard errors,  
something that cannot be achieved using single imputation techniques.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of MICE, both the fraction of missing information 
(FMI)5 and relative efficiency (RE)6 were examined for each variable after using imputed 
data to run the analysis. Determination of the number of imputations that should be 
performed to achieve accurate standard errors is chiefly derived from the variable with 
the highest FMI percentage. The largest FMI value in this case was Christian at 67%, 
thus PIRUS should be imputed at least 67 times. To maximize the likelihood of correct 
standard errors, the data set was imputed 100 times. With each variable’s RE value being 
greater than .99, adding more imputations would provide little benefit.  
                                                             
4 Only the variables in the analytical model were included in the imputation model; no 
auxiliary variables were used. 
 
5 The FMI (fraction of missing information) is the “proportion of the total sampling 
variance that is due to missing data” (“Multiple imputation in STATA,” n.d., Imputation 
Diagnostics section, para. 7) 
 
6 Relative efficiency is “an estimate of the efficiency relative to performing an infinite 
number of imputations (“Multiple imputation in STATA,” n.d., Imputation Diagnostics 
section, para. 8).  
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Variables  
Dependent variables. 
 To test the hypotheses, a multivariate logistic regression model was run in 
STATA (pre-imputation descriptive statistics for all variables are in Table 1, post-
imputation descriptive statistics are in Table 3).  
Table 1     
     
Pre-Imputation Descriptive Statistics for all Variables 
     
Variable Code 
Distribution 
/Mean (SD) N  
% 
Missing 
Values 
Islamist  No (0) 52.99% 804 0% 
 Yes (1) 47.01%   
Social Media No (0) 39.70% 466 42.04% 
 Yes (1) 60.30%   
Radical Friend No (0) 23.92% 510 36.57% 
 Yes (1) 76.08%   
Radical Family  No (0) 74.87% 386 51.99% 
 Yes (1) 25.13%   
Age  Numerical 33.48(13.83) 795 1.12% 
White No (0) 42.20% 763 5.10% 
 Yes (1) 57.80%   
Criminal 
History  No (0) 54.04% 594 26.12% 
 Yes (1) 45.96%   
Education Numerical 3.79(1.46) 388 51.74% 
Mental Illness  No (0) 82.96% 804 0% 
 Yes (1) 17.04%   
Christian No (0) 69.91% 329 59.08% 
 Yes (1) 30.09%   
Grievance  No (0) 42.46% 452 43.78% 
  Yes(1) 57.74%     
Note. All distributions and means do not include missing data. 
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Islamist is two variables combined into one dummy, with “0” meaning an individual 
became radicalized as a part of a far right movement and “1” meaning they were 
radicalized as a part of an Islamist movement.  
 
 Independent variables. 
 To determine the prevalence of social media in radicalization, it was collapsed 
from a categorical variable into a dummy, with “0” indicating social media did not play a 
role in an individual’s radicalization and “1” meaning it did. Two variables were included 
to test social learning theory’s application to radicalization. Radical friend was collapsed  
Table 2
Variable Code 
Distribution
/Mean(SD) N
Distribution/
Mean(SD) N
Social Media No (0) 31.99% 272 50.52% 194
Yes (1) 68.01% 49.48%
Radical Friend No (0) 29.54% 325 14.05% 185
Yes (1) 70.46% 85.95%
Radical Family No (0) 79.39% 296 60% 90
Yes (1) 20.61% 40%
Age Numerical 27.97(9.15) 374 38.38(15.38) 421
White No (0) 82.20% 354 7.58% 409
Yes (1) 17.80% 92.42%
Criminal History No (0) 65.23% 302 42.47% 292
Yes (1) 34.77% 57.53%
Education Numerical 3.82(1.49) 254 3.72(1.41) 134
Mental Illness No (0) 83.86% 378 82.16% 426
Yes (1) 16.14% 17.84%
Christian No (0) 82.31% 260 23.19% 69
Yes (1) 17.69% 76.81%
Grievance No (0) 31.48% 216 52.12% 236
Yes (1) 68.52% 47.88%
Pre-Imputation Comparisons Between Islamists and Far Rightists
Islamist Far Rightist
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from a categorical variable into a dummy; an individual who had no close friends 
involved in radical activities was coded “0” and those with friends engaged in such 
activities, illegal or not, were coded “1”. The presence of radical family members was 
transformed and captured similarly, with “0” signifying an individual did not have a 
family member involved in illegal or legal radical activities and “1” indicating they did.  
 
 
Table 3
Variable Code 
Distribution
/Mean(SD)
Islamist No (0) 52.99%
Yes (1) 47.01%
Social Media No (0) 41.40%
Yes (1) 58.60%
Radical Friend No (0) 22.45%
Yes (1) 77.55%
Radical Family No (0) 66.18%
Yes (1) 33.82%
Age Numerical 32(.69)
White No (0) 42.60%
Yes (1) 57.40%
Criminal History No (0) 53.84%
Yes (1) 46.16%
Education Numerical 3.83(.08)
Mental Illness No (0) 82.96%
Yes (1) 17.04%
Christian No (0) 52.47%
Yes (1) 47.53%
Grievance No (0) 41.10%
Yes (1) 58.90%
Post-Imputation Descriptive Statistics 
for all Variables (n=804)
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Control variables. 
Age is included as a continuous variable capturing an individual’s age at the time 
they were publicly “outed” as an extremist. Race is controlled for using a dummy, white, 
that was collapsed from a categorical variable: “0” indicates an individual is non-white 
while “1” means an individual is white. With criminal history’s prominence as a 
predictor of crime, it was included in the model. It was transformed from a categorical 
into a dummy: “0” means an individual has no history of criminal activity and “1” 
signifies they were previously involved in non-ideological criminal activity. Education 
was collapsed, reordered, and treated as a continuous variable: “1” indicates the 
individual did not attempt high school, “2” indicates some high school, “3” indicates a 
high school diploma, “4” indicates some college or vocational school, “5” indicates a 
college or vocational school degree, “6” indicates some master’s school, “7” indicates a 
master’s degree, “8” indicates some doctoral/professional degree, and “9” indicates a 
doctoral/professional degree. Mental illness was collapsed from a categorical into a 
dummy where “0” signifies an individual had no history of mental illness and “1” 
meaning a history was present. Given many extremist groups adhere to a particular 
religion, an individual’s religious background is taken into account; Christian was 
collapsed into a dummy from a categorical variable with “0” meaning an individual did 
not practice or was not exposed to Christianity prior to radicalization and “1” indicating 
they were. Lastly, due to its importance in current literature, grievance was collapsed into 
a dummy variable and included in the models (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008; Precht, 2007); “0” means an individual never expressed identification 
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or attachment to a specific group that was believed to be under threat or had been 
subjected to injustice, “1” indicates aforesaid emotions were asserted. Descriptive 
statistics comparing Islamists and far rightists are included in table 2, showing a few 
notable similarities and differences. Based on non-missing data, it seems social media is 
common within both Islamist and far right radicalization: 68% and 49% of cases 
respectively. The presence of a radical friend(s) also seems to be typical in both 
processes; 70% of Islamists and 86% of far rightists had at least one radical friend. 
Radical family members are less common in both processes, but are more prevalent in far 
rightists cases (40%) than Islamist cases (21%).  
Results 
 Table 3 displays the results of the dependent variable being regressed on each 
independent variable separately. Significant relationships result across the board with the 
exceptions of education and mental illness. The odds of social media being present in the 
process of radicalization are much higher for Islamists than far rightists. Also, Islamists 
have significantly lower odds of having radical friends and family members compared to 
far rightists. Moving on to the main analysis, including all the variables in a logistic 
regression model (shown in Table 4) reveals a lack of support for both hypotheses, but 
the findings are intriguing nonetheless. Recall the first hypothesis: 
H1: The odds of social media playing a role in radicalization are higher for 
individuals radicalizing as a part of an Islamist movement than those radicalizing 
as a part of a far right movement.   
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With other variables accounted for, social media loses significance. With no considerable 
difference in the presence of social media in radicalization between Islamists and far 
rightists, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
H2: There is no significant difference in the odds of having radical friends and 
family between those being radicalized as a part of an Islamist movement and 
those being radicalized as a part of a far right movement.   
Both radical friend and radical family are significant and negative. Islamists have 72% (p 
= .002) lower odds than far rightists of having a friend who participates in radical 
activities. Their odds of having radical family members are also 75% (p = .001) lower 
when compared to far rightists; therefore, hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Age is negative and significant, with an increase of one year equaling 5% lower 
odds of being radicalized as a part of an Islamist movement compared to a far right  
Table 4
Variable Odds Ratio SE
Social Media 2.09*** .39
Radical Friend .48** .12
Radical Family .34*** .08
Age .96*** .01
White .02*** .004
Criminal History .39*** .07
Education 1.05 .07
Mental Illness .89 .17
Christian .10*** .03
Grievance 2.25*** .44
Ideology
Bivariate Logistic Regression Models
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
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campaign. Unsurprisingly, race and religion achieved statistical significance; the odds of 
whites being radicalized in an Islamist movement are 97% lower than their odds of 
radicalizing as a far rightist, and Christian’s odds are 83% lower respectively. Criminal 
history, education, mental illness, and grievance all failed to achieve significance.  
Discussion 
This study set out to answer the question, how does the presence of social media 
in the process of radicalization vary between Islamist and far right extremists? The 
answer is, it does not seem to differ; no significant difference was found between 
Islamists and far rightists. This is a little surprising given Islamist groups’ almost total 
reliance on social media to radicalize and push individuals to action (Choi, Lee, & 
Cadigan, 2018; Conway, 2019; Gates and Podder, 2015). While the far right has a healthy 
social media presence, contemporary research suggests it lacks the structure and purpose 
Table 5
Variable Odds Ratio SE
Social Media 1.84 .65
Radical Friend .28** .12
Radical Family .25*** .11
Age .95*** .01
White .03*** .01
Criminal History .94 .31
Education 1.10 .14
Mental Illness .90 .34
Christian .17*** .09
Grievance 1.70 .60
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
Ideology
Multivariate Logistic Regression 
Model
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of Islamist content (Conway, 2019). In other words, the current picture painted is one of 
like-minded far rightists socializing in online spaces sharing discourses and reinforcing 
each other’s extremist beliefs, but rarely with the calls to action and instructions in tactics 
so common in Islamist content (Sageman, 2008). The results of this study suggest those 
radicalized to the point of committing some form of action likely had social media 
present in their radicalization process, regardless of ideological movement. It is likely 
that similar to Islamist content, far right social media posts serve to generate and 
reinforce radical thought as well as assist in leading individuals to radical action7. 
Possibly, far right social media looks more similar to Islamist social media than 
previously believed; meaning far right posts go beyond simple discourse and portray 
action as one’s duty, similar to Islamist strategies. This study is only able to scratch the 
surface of social media’s role. While it determined the presence of social media is not 
significantly different between Islamist and far right radicalization, it could not define 
what that role is. Does social media serve to both radicalize thought and motivate action? 
Or is it just one or the other? Does social media’s precise role vary according to 
ideological movement? Better data is needed to answer these questions. 
The results regarding social learning theory proved to be just as intriguing. 
Significant differences were found regarding radical friends and radical family; the odds 
of Islamists having either were much lower compared to far rightists. It seems that the 
presence of radical others is a much more substantial mechanism in the far right 
radicalization process than in the Islamist process, lending only partial support to social 
                                                             
7 It is important to remember all individuals included in PIRUS radicalized to the point of 
action, beyond being radical only in thought. 
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learning theory as an explanation of radicalization. A few different things could explain 
these results. First, it is likely the presence of radical friends is underestimated, especially 
in online settings; it is probable such personal information was not accessible by 
reporters. Second, given the prevalence of far right ideology and culture in the United 
States, far rightists likely had more opportunities to interact with like-minded others in 
offline settings. Coupled, these could clarify the difference in SLT’s explanatory power 
in Islamist and far right radicalization. Regardless, more studies must test SLT’s 
application to all forms of terrorism. Based on the results of the present analysis, it is 
likely such research will signal the need for SLT’s refinement. Age’s significance 
indicates Islamists tend to be younger than far rightists. Additionally, with white 
supremacists and various groups adhering to a radical Christian theology placed under the 
umbrella of the far right, it is not bewildering that Islamists’ odds of being white or 
Christian are significantly lower than far rightists.  
This study is not without significant limitations. First, most of the data comes 
from open sources. While this strategy is efficient when done thoroughly—especially in 
the field of terrorism studies where the population of interest is difficult to reach—it is 
not without its problems. Although investigators utilized random sampling techniques to 
increase representativeness, PIRUS is more than likely a victim of news reporting trends 
over time (LaFree, Jensen, James, & Safer-Lichtenstein, 2008); that is, as reporters begin 
to spotlight one ideological movement, it becomes easier to detect and document 
individuals of that ideological milieu and harder to identify extremists with disparate 
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ideologies8. Second, the data set only contains those who had radicalized in the United 
States, thus the results are not generalizable to extremists in other countries. Third, the 
prevalence of missing data is considerable. While not all variables had missing 
information, most did. Missing values ranged from less than 1% on age up to almost 62% 
on Christian. MICE requires unobserved values to be missing at random, an assumption 
that becomes increasingly difficult to make as the proportion of missing data goes up 
(“Multiple imputation in STATA,” n.d.). Given the high proportions of missing, it is 
suggested readers interpret the preceding results and interpretations with caution. Last, 
the data only allowed the capture of one dimension of social learning theory: differential 
association. PIRUS in its current form is unable to efficiently capture the other elements 
of definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation.  
The findings from this study suggest various directions for policy and future 
research. First, courses in cyber literacy should be commonplace in schools in the United 
States (Gurak, 2001; Omotoyinbo, 2014; Precht, 2007). While the enormous amount of 
radical content online makes it exceptionally difficult for authorities to remove it, cyber 
literacy courses would serve to educate youths on the strategies and lies extremists use to 
pull them in, leaving them better equipped to properly interpret radical posts they stumble 
across online. Huey (2015) suggests political jamming—the practice of using social 
media posts that are attractive to youths, such as memes, to counter radical messages—
                                                             
8 LaFree, Jensen, James, & Safer-Lichtenstein (2008) highlight 9/11, explaining a bias 
towards reporting on Jihadists in the years following. Due to the magnitude of the attacks, 
reporters focused more attention on Islamist extremists and less on far right, far left, and 
single issue individuals, leading to an underestimation of the number non-Islamist 
extremists within this time frame..  
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could be an effective method of making joining an extremist movement look 
unappealing. 
Future research endeavors should continue to define similarities and differences 
between extremists; for as this study shows, they are not all the same (Choi, Lee, and 
Cadigan, 2018; Gill, 2015). The field of terrorism studies would benefit from 
comparisons within (ex. Neo-Nazis versus multiculturalists) and without ideology. Also, 
comparisons to other criminal groups could bear research and policy related fruit; for 
example, there is much we already know about entering and exiting street gangs which 
could prove to be applicable to radicalization (Decker and Pyrooz, 2011; Reid & Valasik, 
2018; Valasik & Reid, 2018). Finally in this regard, some studies have found similarities 
between radicalization and the process of joining legal movements and organizations 
(Haggerty & Bucerius, 2018)9; such analogies would prove insightful. 
Additionally, scholars should turn their attention to what precisely individuals are 
doing and experiencing in extremist online settings so the mechanisms of online 
radicalization can be better understood (Conway, 2017). To better access radical 
populations, researchers must get creative; some have suggested using radical social 
media pages to contact extremists (Sikkens, van San, Sieckelinck, Boeije, and de Winter, 
2017).  Lastly, given the inaccessibility of the population, it is unlikely that complete 
individual level data will become the norm in the near future, necessitating the further use 
                                                             
9 Haggerty and Bucerius (2018) compared radicalization and martialization (the process 
of becoming a soldier) and found six elements that are similar between radicalization and 
martialization: (1) a sense of vicarious injustice, (2) a sense of belonging/identity, (3) 
meaning, excitement, and glory, (4) active recruitment, (5) indoctrination, and (6) group 
solidarity. 
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of multiple imputations techniques. While these strategies generate accurate coefficients 
and standard errors, they rely on often untenable assumptions about the nature of the 
missing data. In the words of Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, and Loughran (2017), “It is 
incumbent upon the researcher to be as transparent and thorough as possible regarding 
the assumptions they are making, and then allow for reasonable debate as to the validity 
of such assumptions” (p. 286). The importance of understanding how individuals become 
extremists cannot be exaggerated. If such mechanisms can be documented and accounted 
for through policy, countless lives will be spared.  
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